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Patents: Hiding from History

The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic
Development, 1790-1920, by B. Zorina Khan

Essay by Stephen M. McJohn*

Patent records can be a rich resource for researchers of all stripes. Economists
have long used patent records in studying the relationship between technology and
economic development. As The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain put it,
“One of the few available quantitative output indicators for technology” is the records of
the patent office.1 Patents also provide a source of information for history of technology
itself, as well as a useful source of technical information. Thomas P. Jones, an influential
figure in early United States patent practice, “envisioned the Patent Office as a great
repository of technical wisdom. He saw it, on one hand as a museum in which the
mechanic could trace the historical progress of the art and, on the other hand, as a
collection which described the present state of the art.”2 Patent records have been used to
rethink the role of marginalized groups, as in Mothers and Daughters of Invention: Notes
*
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122 (Cambridge U. Press 2004).
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for a Revised History of Technology3 and A Hammer in Their Hands: A Documentary
History of Technology and the African-American Experiences.4 Patent records have
facilitated more specialized histories, such as Cotton: Origin, History, Technology and
Production5 or Glass: The Miracle Maker: The Miracle Maker, Its History, Technology
And Applications.6 Often the only remaining documentary evidence of an invention is its
patent record.7 Patents have played a role in forensic research. Art conservation scientists
used patents on paints and pigments to conclude that certain paintings attributed to
Jackson Pollock were actually painted after his death.8 Patents even play a role in
biographical research. The patents of Abraham Lincoln ("A Device for Buoying Vessels
Over Shoals")9 and Albert Einstein (“Refrigerator”)10 show less known sides of their
personalities.

3

Autumn Stanley, Mothers and Daughters of Invention: Notes for a Revised History of Technology
(Rutgers U. Press 1995).
4
Carroll W. Pursell, ed., A Hammer in Their Hands: A Documentary History of Technology and
the African-American Experience (MIT Press 2005)(discussing numerous inventions patented by African
American inventors).
5
C. Wayne Smith, Joe Tom Cothren, Cotton: Origin, History, Technology and Production, 78
(Wiley 1999)(discussing market competition sparked by patented cotton gin “which used spikes attached to
a cylinder rather than the saws used in modern gins.).
6
Charles John Phillips, Glass: The Miracle Maker: The Miracle Maker, Its History, Technology
And Applications , 184 (Pittman 1941).
7
See, e.g., Robert S. Woodbury, History of the Gear-cutting Machine: A Historical Study in
Geometry and Machines, 106 Technology Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1958) (“Another
hobbing machine of which we have only the patent was that of Henry Belfield . . .... See his Patent No.
120023 of Oct. 17, 1871”). See also Jo Carrillo, Protecting A Piece Of American Folklore: The Example Of
The Gusset, 4 J. Intell. Prop. L. 203, 232 n. 138 (1997)(“As there is no patent number or mark on the single
remaining ‘Ladies' Hiking Tog’ garment that survives in the Levi Strauss & Co. Archives, the garment
itself confirms Levi historian McDonough's statement that it was not constructed under a patent. But note
that this type of gusset, which is distinct from the public domain gusset, was eventually patented. See U.S.
Patent No. 4,392,259; U.S. Patent No. 3,745,589, "Triangular Crotches for Trousers," issued to Ebbe Bruno
Borsing, (Jul. 17, 1973); U.S. Patent No. 478,190”)(cross citations omitted).
8
Randy Kennedy, A Pollock, in the Eyes of Art and Science, New York Times A18 (February 4,
2007).
9
United States Patent No. 6,469 (May 22, 1849).
10
United States Patent No. 1,781,541 (Nov. 11, 1930). See also Jim Bieberich, Significant Historical
Patents of the United States , at http://www.uspat.com/historical/.
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But the utility of the records is limited to the information disclosed. The first part
of this essay looks at a recent book that relied heavily on patent records and copyright
registrations to reexamine acutely the role of intellectual property in economic
development, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American
Economic Development, 1790-1920 (“Democratization”), by B. Zorina Khan. The
essay’s second part discusses how patent law today discourages an inventor from
accurately disclosing her invention and its place in technological development. Several
aspects of patent law encourage applicants to describe and claim not what they have
invented, but rather a vague and overbroad version of their invention. Rather than
encouraging accurate disclosure, patent law encourages what has been called “intentional
obscurity.”11 The essay then considers how proposals for patent reform fit would likely
affect the value of patents for future researchers, concluding that reforms that improve the
quality of patent applications for their primary purposes (such as examination, licensing
and litigation) would likewise improve their value for the future.
I.

Patent records as a primary historical source
Intellectual property has standard stories: The United States has gone from the

greatest pirate to the greatest policeman of intellectual property rights. European
intellectual property differs from its American cousin because it rests on a philosophical,
not economic, grounding. Great inventors differ from mere patent-seeking marketers.
Intellectual property faces unprecedented challenges in the light of 21st Century
technologies. Democratization debunks those stories, using detailed empirical research to
more fully explain the role intellectual property law and institutions played in economic

11

Dennis Crouch, Philips v. AWH Takes A Casualty: "Interface" Construed As "Parallel Bus
Interface," www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/philips_v_awh_t.html (May 11, 2006).
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development of the 19th Century United States. Democratization draws on several
categories of historical sources in addressing a number of historical issues, but relies
primarily on the records of the United States Patent Office. Those records contain not just
the description of each invention and the claims, but also inventors’ occupations, gender,
race, and geographical category; citations to other patents; assignments of patent
ownership; and other information.
A familiar tale in intellectual property is the conversion of the United States from
nineteenth century pirate to twentieth century policeman. No law school intellectual
property course or debate about TRIPS seems complete with mentioning that the United
States has only gradually and conveniently come to the side of intellectual property, after
freely taking the fruits of other countries’ creators for much of its history. The complaints
of Charles Dickens echo more than century later. Democratization shows that the United
States was, if anything, even more calculating in its attention to whether to give rights to
foreigners. In copyright, the tale is true. Only inch by inch, finally ending in 1989, did the
United States come to join the international copyright regime. But with respect to patents,
the opposite is true. The United States was an early adherent to international patent
standards and to recognizing the rights of foreign inventors.
Democratization uses patent records and other historical sources to show how the
different treatment of copyright and patents made eminent sense for the United States
during the “long Nineteenth Century.” As a new nation with a relatively undeveloped
literary heritage, the United States had much to gain by disregarding international
copyright.12 There was a large body of English language works ready to be harvested.
United States publishers were unconstrained by licensing fees, which could benefit
12

See Democratization at 222-25.
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United States consumers (even if American authors were doubly disadvantaged, by
competing against free imports and by lack of protection abroad).
But in the field of patent law, the United States was more ready to compete.
Americans were early contributors to technological innovation, and patent law reflected
that. Domestically, the United States was quick to implement a thorough patent law and
an effective office to administer the law.13 Internationally, the US quickly joined
international agreements and gave patent protection to foreign inventors. The patent
records reflect the widespread impulse in the US to invent – and to seek commercial
advantage from patenting inventions. The number of patents per capita was greater in the
US than elsewhere.14 Influential figures often credited the US patent system for the
widespread technological advances in the US, along with its economic benefits.15
United States patent law did differ from the systems in Europe. The differences
both reflected and reinforced the democratic nature of the United States, in several senses
of the word. In Europe, patent law reflected a more elitist basis. Patents were not given so
freely, rather reserved for special inventions. Patent fees were high, making it
impracticable for the average inventor to secure intellectual property rights.16 The
national patent offices were strongly influenced by aristocratic privilege, meaning that
social connections were often more important in securing rights than individual inventive
contributions. One French applicant included the apparently relevant information that that
wife was a wealthy heiress and gave her five first names, along with the name of her

13

Democratization at 53.
Democratization at 62.
15
Democratization at 54 (quoting contemporary observer: “The cheap patent law of the United
States has been and still is the secret of the great success of that country.”).
16
Democratization at 47, 63-64.
14
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noble family.17 His application was granted. Drawing on records from the respective
patent systems, Democratization shows that patentees in Europe were more likely to be
from the elite classes than in the US.18 They were also more likely than in the US to be
from the major cities, as opposed the poorer rural regions.19
Patent law operated quite differently in the young United States. The patent office
was in some senses of the most democratic institutions in the country. Rather than a place
of patronage, the patent office was subject to typically American checks and balances.
This resulted in greater confidence in the office, with a marked difference in controls on
patents. In some European countries, there was no system of patent examination, for fear
that examiners would extract favors in exchange for favorable rulings. But because the
USPTO was relatively politically independent and trustworthy (relatively!) patent
applications were examined before patents issued.20
Other limitations were also absent in the US. Patent fees were kept far lower than
other countries, allowing far greater social access to patent rights. Even the cost of
mailing the application was spared the inventor, under the US Post Office policy to give
free postage to patent applications.21 The standard for patent protection was also lower.
Rather than reserving patents for exceptional inventions, patents were granted for even
modest contributions to homely technologies.
The USPTO was also relatively more open than other governmental institutions.
Inventors were not barred by race or gender from applying for patents. Free blacks
secured patents as early as 1821, although slaves were still denied the ability to patent
17
18
19
20
21

Democratization at 44 n. 55.
Democratization at 63.
Democratization 59-60.
Democratization at 51-53.
Democratization at 59.
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their inventions.22 Women regularly received patents, although family and property law
often denied them the ability to fully exploit their inventions commercially.23 Low patent
fees and a straightforward examination process meant that lack of wealth, education, or
connections would not a bar to patent protection.
Democratization then goes beyond describing the differences in social and legal
factors in the US patent system to detailed empirical investigation of the social effects of
those differences. The more open US system did affect the actual access by inventors.
The number of patents issued per capita in the United States was much higher than in
other countries. Democratization then traces a number of specific economic
repercussions. The occupations of patentees, as disclosed in applications, reflected shifts
in economic activity. For several decades beginning in 1790, most patentees were
involved in bringing goods into the country, such as merchants.24 As economic
development opened up more spheres of domestic manufacturing (as opposed to relying
on imports from more developed countries), so the range of patentee’s occupations
broadened, to include artisans, engineers, and manufacturers.25 By 1860, merchants had
gone from the majority of patentees to less than 3.3 %.26
Democratization also mines the patent records to explore whether inventors
tended to specialize in particular sectors of industry. One might expect increasing
specialization over time, as technology became more sophisticated, making it more
difficult for inventors to work broadly or in multiple fields. But Democratization found
(after controlling for such variables as region, access to transportation, and urbanization)
22
23
24
25
26

Democratization at 124-25.
Democratization at 129-81.
Democratization at 114.
Democratization at 115.
Democratization at 115-16.
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no trend toward specialization.27 Very likely market incentives to work broadly
counterbalanced technological barriers.28
Democratization uses the patent records to explore the characteristics of prolific
inventors. “Great inventors,” it transpires, sought patents in patterns quite similar to
ordinary inventors. The popular culture figure of the great inventor, struggling to push
technology forward and detached from others’ concerns about commerce, does not
withstand statistical analysis of patent records. Prolific inventors sought patents in
profitable areas of commerce, changed areas of technology along with changes in the
overall economy, moved their workplaces to locations with low transportation costs and
ready markets, and filed applications in patterns that corresponded with rose and fell with
economic cycles of expansion and recession.29 The characteristics of prolific inventors,
however, changed over time. During the early 19th Century, they tended to lack formal
education, and concentrated in areas that rewarded “trial and error experimentation.”30 In
later decades, with increasing complexity in technology and commerce, prolific inventors
tended to have formal training in science or engineering.31
The historical perspective of Democratization shows that many of today’s patent
controversies are old wine in new bottles. Much is said of how today’s rapidly changing
technologies offers special challenges to intellectual property law. But many “new”
developments are new versions of old stories. There is concern that the increase of
patenting along with the spread of patent subject matter will lead to patent thickets, areas
of technology such as software where innovation is hemmed by patents. But patents have
27
28
29
30
31

Democratization at 118.
Democratization at 120.
Democratization at 188.
Democratization at 187-88.
Democratization at 220.

8
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=969447

often been somewhat concentrated. Swiss inventors seeking US patents in the 19th
Century, for example, were strongly skewed toward the areas of music boxes and
watches.32 Others have shown early concerns about patent thickets in such areas as sugar
manufacturing.33
Today’s patent problems have naturally led to proposals that the standards for
patents should be raised. The KSR case presently pending before the Supreme Court turns
on the proper standard for holding that an invention is nonobvious and therefore
patentable.34 Some, including the U.S. Solicitor General, have argued that exclusive
rights could be limited to only exceptional innovations. Democratization exhaustively
shows, however, one considerable advantage to the early US economy was that
incremental inventions could be patented, meaning there was considerable incentive for
modest invention, and resources were directed that way. That suggests that the problem
today may be not that too many modest inventions are patentable, but rather that patents
are issuing where there is insufficient disclosure to show whether the applicant has truly
invented anything.
Recent years have seen a number of movements actively disavowing intellectual
property rights. The free software movement, also known as open source software,
developers give up most of their rights in their code (patent, copyright, trademark, and

32

Democratization at 292.
See Bronwyn H. Hall, Issues in and Possible Reforms of the U. S. Patent System 3
(2006)(symposium paper) (dating before 1865: “In the manufacture with which I am connected – the sugar
trade – there are somewhere like 300 or 400 patents. Now, how are we to know all these 400 patents? How
are we to manage continually, in the natural process of making improvements in manufacture, to know
which of these patents we are at any time conflicting with?”).
34
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965, 2966 (U.S. 2006)(granting cert. to hear case o
issue of proper standard for obviousness determination).
33
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trade secret) in software they have developed.35 Other authors use licenses like the
Creative Commons License to effectively put their writings in the public domain.36
Democratization reminds us that the constraints of intellectual property law have
similarly rankled the very authors and inventors who could use it. Patent dissenters in the
1800’s deliberately left their inventions unpatented, in the public interest.37 Patent
abolitionists in a number of countries sought the repeal of patent laws, even succeeding in
Holland for a number of years.38
Democratization shows the great value of patent records as research sources,
relying on them for several types of historical work: social, political, technological, and
economic. The book fits into a long line of works using patents as primary research
sources. This section turns to the value of today’s patents for future researchers.

II.

Today’s patents as tomorrow’s history
A future historian working with today’s patents would have much material to

work with. Less than one million patents were issued during the 19th Century.39 Almost
one million patents were issued just in the years 2000 through 2005.40 The range of
patentable subject matter has increased dramatically in recent decades, to include such
areas as software, biotechnology, and business methods.41 So patents would seem to
provide a trove of information for researchers in many areas.

35

See generally Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes Of Free Software, 9 George Mason Law
Review 25 (2000).
36
See creativecommons.org.
37
Democratization at 205.
38
Democratization at 289-90.
39
See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/06-09.htm.
40
Id.
41
See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998)(affirming that business methods are patentable).
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The information in those patents, however, is likely to be much less helpful than a
researcher would hope. A common justification for patent rights is the implicit bargain:
an inventor discloses her invention in exchange for a grant of exclusive rights.42 So rather
than using the invention as a trade secret, she makes it public in exchange for legal
protection against copiers.43 She has to make several types of disclosure: the written
description must describe the invention, along with the best mode of making and using
the invention. The claims must claim what is new about her invention, entitling her to a
patent. She must also disclose relevant prior art of which she is aware, meaning she must
tell the USPTO of things like other patents, technology, and publications which would be
relevant in deciding if her claimed invention is indeed new and nonobvious.
That scheme sounds good not just for the patent office and courts and others
interested in the technology, but for future historians. Someone in 2060 writing about the
early years of internet commerce would have many patents to read, on such inventions as
online business methods and efficient means of handing network traffic.44 The researcher
might expect the patents to fully disclose what the claimed invention was, what its
important features were, what various ways it could be embodied in different
technologies, what other devices had come before, and how the advantages and
disadvantages of the patented invention compared to other existing technology. But
patent law, in its present state, discourages applicants from fully disclosing those matters.

42

See, e.g. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 151 (U.S. 1989)(“The federal patent
system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new,
useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the
invention for a period of years.”).
43
See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 371 (2002).
44
In the age of email, electronic archives, and digital memory generally, present inventors are likely
to leave many more traces than those of the 19th Century. But patent records will remain important, because
other records are likely to be less organized and publicly accessible than patent databases.
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Rather, experts in claim drafting offer the following advice to inventors and
patent drafters:45 Do not define the terms used in your claims. Do not identify the
category of invention in the preamble to the claims. Do not identify features of the
invention as “important.” Do not even use the word “invention” in the written
description. Such claim drafting has been described as a trend toward “intentional
obscurity.”46 The case law similarly encourages limiting the disclosure in the written
description. Do not explain the flaws of competing technology, or the advantages of the
claimed invention. If the invention is software-related, do not submit a copy of the
program code. Do not do a prior art search to see if others have invented similar
technology, because you will then have to submit any relevant prior art along with your
patent application. Do not even keep up on technology in the field, because if you find
out that others have developed relevant technology, you will likewise have to let the
USPTO know. As to describing the “background of the invention”: one patent litigator
regards it an “admission against interest.”47
In short, while an inventor might want to set down her role in the development of
technology as fully as possible in her patent application, her patent practitioner may
advise her to do exactly the opposite: Disclose only what is necessary to get your patent,
because more disclosure gives courts more grounds to read your claims narrowly. As to
knowledge of the field generally, avoid learning about relevant prior art, then you do not
have to disclose it. If real property had such rules, then a party filing a deed, rather than

45

The legal rules prompting such advices are discussed infra.
See Dennis Crouch, Philips v. AWH Takes A Casualty: "Interface" Construed As "Parallel Bus
Interface," www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/philips_v_awh_t.html (May 11, 2006).
47
Jeffrey L. Snow, Claim Drafting Issues from the Litigator’s Point of View, Tactics for Mastering
Markman Issues (October 20, 2006)(patent law presentation).
46
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giving the location of the property in metes and bounds, would simply disclose that she
claims some real estate, of unspecified dimensions, somewhere in the vicinity.
To take one example, Albert Einstein’s 1930 patent on a refrigerator would likely
have been drafted much less lucidly today. Einstein’s patent, reflecting his practical and
commercial interest in refrigeration, has been explored by numerous writers. This side of
him contrasts with his popular image as an abstract, nonworldly genius. The patent is a
clear exposition of the invention of Einstein and Leo Szilard. So clear, that it violates
several of today’s obfuscatory patent drafting tips in the first two paragraphs. Its first
words are “Our invention,” a phrase to be avoided.48 The second paragraph explores “the
objects and advantages of our invention,” aspects which a canny drafter today would
avoid, because they could be used to limit the scope of the claims to a refrigerator with
precisely those attributes.49 The patent then goes on to discuss “a preferred embodiment
of our invention,” a phrase to be avoided for the same reason (risking limiting the scope
of the claims to that particular embodiment).50 The claims begin with the preamble
“refrigerating apparatus,” where claim drafting practice often advises to dispense with a
preamble, because it means that the claim will not be read to encompass other possible
uses of the technology developed in the future.51 Overall, the written description and
claims convey precisely what the inventors have developed and how it fits into the
relevant field of technology. Such a document has proved useful to many Einstein
biographers (and even writers on refrigeration). One doubts if the sort of vague,

48
49
50
51

United States Patent No. 1,781,541 at 1 (Nov. 11, 1930).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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generalized, overbroad application encouraged by today’s patent law would have told any
more than that Einstein had done something or other in the area of refrigeration.
Patent’s law strange discouragement of disclosure flows partly from the
relationship between the written description and the claims. The claims define the scope
of patent rights. Claims must use words to describe inventions. Lawyers, of course, fight
over interpreting words in every area of the law: interpretation of statutes, judicial
decisions, contracts, regulations. Claim interpretation is a key step in patent litigation.
The court interprets the claims, to see if they are broad enough to cover the alleged
infringer’s technology. Courts must decide such matters as: how broadly does “about”
mean in a claim,52 what a “download component” is,53 even what the meaning of
“means” is.54
In interpreting the words of the claim, the first place courts look is to the patent
itself.55 The written description is often used to interpret the claims. Many decisions have
given a narrow reading to apparently broad claims, based on the written description
portion of the application. If the written description defines a term used in the claims, the
patentee’s right will be limited to that definition, even if it is narrower than the customary
meaning of the word.56 Where the written description refers to “the invention,” the claims

52

See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1133, 19
(Fed. Cir. 2007)(holding that claim term of “a weight ratio of about 1:5” encompassed only “a range of
ratios no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1”).
53
Network Commerce, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 422 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (deciding
whether “metafiles or Windows Media Player standing alone constitutes a ‘download component’").
54
See, e.g., Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2000)(interpreting whether use of “means” in claim triggered means-plus-function rule).
55
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(en banc).
56
See, e.g., Boss Control, Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., 410 F.3d 1372, 1376-79 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(“
Because the specification makes clear that the invention involves a two-stage interrupt mode, the intrinsic
evidence binds Boss to a narrower definition of "interrupt" than the extrinsic evidence might support.”)
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may be interpreted to cover only that specific device.57 Where the “background of the
invention” section disparaged the use of a serial interface, a patent claim for a personal
digital assistant was read to cover only a direct parallel bus.58 The court also considered
the fact that the applicant had described the use of a direct parallel bus as “a very
important feature” of the device.59 If a claimed invention has broad use, but the
specification focuses on particular applications, the claims may be read narrowly.60
Patent drafters have reacted to such claim interpretation cases with obfuscation,
by avoiding the disclosures that triggered narrow readings. As one commentator has
ruefully stated, “Patent drafters would do well to ensure that nothing in the patent
document is ‘important,’ ‘essential,’ ‘required,’ or the like. Those terms do help the
patent readers better understand your preferred embodiment, but in court they will only
limit your claim scope.”61
Patent applications must disclose relevant prior art to the patent office. But an
applicant need only disclose prior art of which she is aware.62 So an applicant need not
actively seek relevant material, rather she need only disclose material she knows of.63
This creates the perverse incentive to actively avoid learning of other work in the field,

57

See Dennis Crouch, Use of Phrase "This Invention" Limits Claim Scope,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/06/cafc_use_of_phr.html (June 25, 2006).
58
Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See
also AstraZeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Where the general
summary or description of the invention describes a feature of the invention (here, micelles formed by the
solubilizer) and criticizes other products (here, other solubilizers, including co-solvents) that lack that same
feature, this operates as a clear disavowal of these other products").
59
Id. at 1354.
60
See, e.g. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006)(“
Although we agree with the district court that the Ross invention does not concern itself with whether the
"customer" reads the book or obtains it for resale, the focus of the Ross patent is immediate single-copy
printing and binding initiated by the customer and conducted at the customer's site.”).
61
Dennis Crouch, Philips v. AWH Takes A Casualty: "Interface" Construed As "Parallel Bus
Interface," www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/philips_v_awh_t.html (May 11, 2006).
62
See 37 C.F.R. 1.56 (known as Rule 56).
63
Thomas Schneck, The Duty to Search, 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 689 (2005).
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both for inventors and their patent attorneys. Indeed, some applicants fear that if they
search prior art, they face the dilemma of a determination that they failed to disclosed
prior art or that they disclosed too much prior art, “hiding material prior art amidst
"junk" prior art.”64 Patent applications often do show surprisingly little discolosure of
relevant technology.65
The claims also serve disclosure, in a sense. The inventor must claim the new and
obvious aspect of her invention. Her patent rights are limited to what she claims. So one
might think that, at least with respect to claims, there is a strong incentive to set the
record straight about the place of the invention in the development of technology. But, as
to claims, there is again an incentive against accurate disclosure. Here, the incentive is to
claim too much (as opposed to disclosing the bare minimum). An inventor may file
multiple claims in her application. Some claims may be rejected. As long as some claims
are allowed, the patent will issue. If the inventor, now patentee, sues someone for patent
infringement, the defendant will likely contend that the patent is invalid. The court may
find some of the claims invalid, and some valid. As long as one of the claims is valid and
infringed, the patentee wins. Nowhere along the way is there a penalty for filing too
many claims, or for filing claims that are broader than the actual invention. The only risk
is that a particular claim may be rejected or held invalid. That does not affect the validity
of other claims. The incentive is not for the patentee to draft claims that best match up to
what she has actually invented. Her best strategy is to draft lots of claims, ranging from

64

Id. at 695.
See generally Gregory Aharonian, Internet Patent News Service,
http://www.bustpatents.com/archive.htm (patent news letter that frequently gives examples of issued
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narrow to broad. The burden is on the USPTO, or subsequent infringers, or anyone else
who thinks the patent is too broad, to invalidate the claims – one at a time.
As a record of technological history, the claims are quite suspect. If inventor
makes a modest invention, her patent application may well claim that modest invention –
but also claim much broader versions of it that she actually could not make. If the patent
makes it through the USPTO (as most applications do, valid or not) and no one spends
millions of dollars in litigation to have the broad claims patent invalidated, then the
patent record would considerably overstate her contribution to technological progress.
The applicant must also provide disclosure that would enable others to make and
use the invention.66 But courts have applied the enablement requirement leniently with
respect to newer subject matter areas such as software and business methods.67 For
example, an applicant for a software patent need not disclose the code that she uses. The
level of disclosure is low, even in “good” software patents.68 The lower disclosure
requirement for such patents means not just that the patent is easier to get, but that it is
more difficult to figure out what (if anything) the applicant has really invented.
The rules governing prior art discourage disclosure, even acquiring knowledge.
Democratization was not a history of technology, but rather of the interplay between
intellectual property law and economic development. So the book did not look closely at
the written descriptions of individual inventions, rather at large data bases of such data as
patent citations and categories of invention. But even that basic data, today, is subject to
66
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distorted disclosure. Patent citations’ role as an indicator of the importance of the
invention is undercut where applicants are unlikely to know of or disclose relevant prior
art, and the patent examiner is likewise unlikely to uncover it. Even the categories of
invention are unreliable, where an applicant is encouraged to claim her invention as
broadly as possible (beyond the category of commercial activity where her actual
invention arose) and where subject matter such as software and business method can
likewise extend very widely. The rest of the application is likely to be no more help in
telling a future reader the category of the invention, where a savvy applicant will not
specifically describe the background and development of the invention.
All these problems (discouragement of disclosure in the written description and
prior art and encouragement of overclaiming) are exacerbated by the expansion of patent
subject matter.69 Patent law now reaches into areas such as business methods and
software. Such patents are different than patents on airplanes or xylophones. A patent on
a particular machine or drug, regardless of how broadly the claims are worded, is
inherently limited to certain spheres of activity. Someone making lawnmowers will not
infringe a patent on a flying machine, as long as the lawnmower does not fly. Business
method and software patents, by contrast, are often much more abstract, with potential
applications across the range of human activities. The abstract nature of new patent
subject matter raises many problems for patent policy. It likewise adds to the problems of
inaccuracy from limited descriptions and overbroad claims. Where the written description
is as spartan as possible, there is little to give concrete meaning to the abstract invention
69
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claimed.70 Where there is no penalty to claiming broadly, an actual abstract invention
may well be claimed in even more abstract terms. Such a patent is likely to be somewhat
mystifying to someone who later tries to figure out just what the invention was, and
where it fit in with what others have done.71
Other rules in patent law, of course, do tend to favor disclosure. An application
must at least meet the minimum requirements of a written description and include claims.
Sometimes a fuller written description will help in enforcing the patent. A court might
find that a claim that on its face appears invalid (because it is indefinite, ambiguous, or
overbroad), can be interpreted as valid in light of the written description. Sometimes a
patentee’s argument for interpretation of a claim turn will succeed because it best fits
with the written description. A definition in the written description will likewise
sometimes help the patentee. But these rules are unlikely to outweigh the more specific
hazards of providing unnecessary disclosure that may hurt the patentee in litigation. A
patentee need not choose between the benefits of limited disclosure (such as reducing the
risk of narrow construction) and fuller disclosure (reducing the risk of claims being held
indefinite or overbroad). The patentee can get both sets of benefits, because she controls
the drafting of the claims. She can seek to draft clearer claims (to reduce risks of
indefiniteness, ambiguity, etc.) and she can submit multiple, increasingly broader claims,
to hedge the risk of overbreadth.

70

[ See James Bessen & Michael Meurer, Do Patents Work? The Empirical Evidence That Today's
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So today’s patents are a much poorer record of technological history than they
could be, compared to a patent law that encourage inventors to fully disclose just what
they had invented and where it fit in to the landscape of technology. But the purpose of
patent law is not to preserve history, the purpose is to promote innovation by providing
incentives to inventors. The patent records are a rich trove for future researchers, but that
is simply a nice by-product of the patent system, not its goal. One would not advocate
substantial reforms in patent law simply to improve the quality of primary sources for
future historians. Changing the incentives would help future historians, but changes in
patent law would change its more immediate effects.
Many of the best proposals for patent reform, however, do indeed favor more
accurate disclosure by inventors. There is widespread agreement that the patent system
itself needs a measure of reinvention. Various studies have found that somewhere
between one half and one third of patents that are litigated are held invalid.72 This
suggests that the patent office is issuing many patents that should have been rejected. The
most likely reason is the problem of prior art. A patent examiner lacks the time and
resources to accurately determine whether a claimed invention is really new, because that
would require knowing about everything relevant that had ever been published or put into
public use. Rather, the examiner relies largely on the prior art disclosed by the applicant
and the examiner’s own search, which in turn relies heavily on previous patents. Another
great problem with patents is the uncertainty of claim interpretation. No one really knows
how broad a patent is until the courts have interpreted its claims (if they ever do).
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Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998).
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Reforms directed toward such problems often rely on improving the quality of disclosure
to the patent office.
Commentators have suggested many means to improve patent quality. Some
focus on the applicant. Applicants could be required to do a prior art search themselves,
as opposed to simply disclosing prior art of which they know.73 Applicants could be
given the option of paying a higher application fee in exchange (enabling the patent
office doing a more thorough search) in exchange for a stronger presumption of patent
validity.74 Other proposals seek to get other parties add prior art to the patent record. A
post-grant opposition process would permit other parties (such as competitors, standards
organizations, or public interest groups) an opportunity to present evidence of
invalidating prior art before a patent is issued.75
Other reform measures seek to develop other sources of information. As opposed
to changing the legal rules governing disclosure by the applicant, some seek to open up
the lines of disclosure to other parties. A number of initiatives seek to improve the prior
art available to the patent office. The patent office will attempt a pilot project to
implement Community Patent Review, using Wikipedia-like technology, where
73
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interested parties are invited to submit material relevant to pending applications.76 The
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Patent Busting Project solicits knowledgeable parties to
identify improperly issued patents that threaten to stifle innovation, and to submit
materials tending to show that claimed inventions were not new.77 Monetary rewards
could be given to those who bring forward evidence that invalidates a patent.78 All of
those measures would have the secondary effect of increasing the likely value of patent
records as a research source.

Conclusion.
The main purpose of the patent system is not to develop a storehouse of
technological history. But better disclosure is closely linked to the functioning of the
patent system. The present rules encourage limited and vague description of the
invention, blissful ignorance of work by others (and therefore no disclosure of it), and
overbroad claiming of the invention. Better disclosure would help the PTO in
determining whether a patent should issue, would give better notice of the inventor’s
claimed invention to the others interested in the technology, and help courts in claim
construction. How to adapt the various rules affecting disclosure affects a delicate
balance of patent policies. The long view encouraged by thinking about patents as
primary historical sources could be helpful. Much of the present activity in patent reform
is driven by specific industries, which have quite different axes to grind. Computer and
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pharmaceutical companies have lined up on opposite sides on many issues, both in
Congress and in the courts. Thinking about patents long term is no touchstone, but does
emphasize the basic value of accuracy in the annals of invention.
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